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This paper analyzes policies by means of which a whole society in an initial state of
illiteracy and low productivity can raise itself into a condition of continuous growth.
Using an overlapping generations model in which human capital is formed through child
rearing and formal education, we show that an escape from a poverty trap, in which
children work full time and no human capital accumulation takes place, is possible
through compulsory education or programs of taxes and transfers. If school attendance is
unenforceable, temporary inequality is unavoidable if the society is to escape in finite
time, but long-run inequalities are avoidable provided sufficiently heavy, but temporary,
taxes can be imposed on the better off. Programs that aim simply at high attendance rates
in the present can be strongly nonoptimal.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Parental care and abilities exert a powerful influence upon a child’s linguistic
and intellectual development. The process of child-rearing thus involves an in-
tergenerational transfer that creates a certain potential in the child, which, if
fully realized through the instilling of existing social knowledge, can lead to the
continuous growth of human capital construed in the broad sense and hence of
individual productivity.1 Without formal education, however, children will almost
surely attain only a small part of this potential, modest though it might be if their
parents happen to be unlettered and poor. If children can work to supplement the
family’s income and parents cannot borrow against their children’s future income
[Baland and Robinson (2000), Hazan and Berdugo (2002)], parents may decide
to deny their children any schooling at all. This perpetuates their own condition of
We thank Franc¸ois Bourguignon, Ramona Bruhns, Shanta Devarajan, Noemi Hummel, Bernhard Pachl, Martin
Ravallion, Lars Siemers, and Nicholas Stern, as well as participants at the Development Economics Conference
(NEUDC) 2000 and seminars at Memphis, Regensburg, and the World Bank, for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
We are also indebted to two referees of this journal for valuable and constructive suggestions. The responsibility for
all errors is ours alone. Address correspondence to: Hans Gersbach, CER-ETH—Center of Economic Research at
ETH Zurich and CEPR, ETH Zurich, Zu¨richbergstrasse 18, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland; e-mail: hgersbach@ethz.ch.
c© 2009 Cambridge University Press 1365-1005/09 220
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100508080036
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 21:17:26, subject to the Cambridge Core
CHILD LABOR AND THE EDUCATION OF A SOCIETY 221
ignorance and low productivity into the next generation, whereupon the process
continues. From a long-term perspective, the ensuing failure to build human capital
must be counted as the main social cost of child labor.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze policies by means of which a whole
society that is initially mired in a state of illiteracy and low productivity can raise
itself into a condition of literacy and continuous growth.2 Our main innovation is
the analysis of sequences of tax-and-transfer programs—as opposed to compulsory
education.3 In view of the patchy enforcement of compulsory education in many
poor countries, these programs offer a potentially more practicable way of escaping
from the poverty trap.
We consider a model economy populated by overlapping generations with a
continuum of agents who possess some altruism and choose their children’s level of
formal education. The formation of human capital occurs through a combination of
child-rearing and formal schooling. Adults cannot borrow against their offspring’s
future income. All have the same preferences and the first generation start with
identical endowments. Hence, any ensuing economic inequality, short-run or long-
run alike, is caused by redistributive policies. The production technology is of the
AK type.
The model yields the following results. First, an escape from the poverty trap
can always be accomplished through a program of compulsory education, though
lump-sum redistributive taxes may be necessary if the educational “technology”
is not convex. Such a policy is effectively first-best in the setting considered
here, because the allocation of current full income between current consumption
and investment in human capital through education is directly determined. This
benchmark optimum is also attainable through equivalent nonlinear subsidies and
taxes.
If any of these instruments is not available, the situation takes on a second-
best character. The intervention we analyze can be described as income support
for some sections of the population, financed by lump-sum taxes on the rest. An
escape from the poverty trap may still be possible, albeit with an important draw-
back: temporary inequality in post-tax incomes and human capital is a necessary
condition to escape from poverty in finite time, though long-term inequalities can
be avoided provided the government enjoys enough freedom in choosing taxes
on incomes. An inability to tax the well-to-do sufficiently heavily during the
transition can result in, not only a delay in attaining full, universal education, but
also persistent long-run inequality.
Programs that minimize the time needed to attain this educational goal do not
maximize school attendance rates in any particular period. Rather, they reflect
the connection between the schooling received by succeeding members of the
lineages of children who are educated today and the expansion of taxable capacity
and the avoidance of subsidies in the future. Indeed, maximization of the school
attendance rate in a particular period can induce a slide back into the poverty trap.
There is now a substantial literature on the economics of child labor.4 The possi-
bility of multiple equilibria in a one-period setting, with a high-wage equilibrium
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in which the children do not work, and a low-wage one in which they do, was
first established by Basu and Van (1998) and discussed by Swinnerton and Rogers
(1999). Some theoretical contributions employ a two-period structure. In Baland
and Robinson (2000), parents expect to receive support from their children in
old age, and their decisions concerning education can fall prey to time inconsis-
tency. Ranjan (1999) implicitly rules out this particular problem, and concentrates
instead on the case where parents would send their children to school if they
had access to credit but are unable to borrow against the increase in income that
schooling would generate. Jafarey and Lahiri (2000) examine to what extent credit
opportunities such as “food for education” or “investment in education quality”
can lower the incidence of child labor and increase the effectiveness of educational
investments.
The possible connection between child labor and fertility is only touched on
here. Dessy (2000) considers an infinitely lived “dynasty” with preferences over
the sequences of consumption levels and family sizes. A poverty trap is possible,
with an unstable equilibrium separating a low-productivity, high-fertility steady
state from a high-productivity, low-fertility one. A poverty trap can also occur
in Hazan and Berdugo’s (2002) OLG (overlapping generations) framework, in
which educated labor is employed in an advanced sector, but children can only
find traditional employment. Sustained growth in output per head is eventually
triggered, and then maintained, by the accumulation of human capital, first through
mere natural increase and then through the education of more slowly growing
numbers, there being some critical level of aggregate human capital at which the
investment in upgrading the technology needed to launch the advanced sector
becomes profitable. Intervention in the form of compulsory education, with lump-
sum taxation of the children on reaching adulthood to compensate their parents
in old age, hastens this process and is Pareto-improving. Strulik (2004) highlights
the role of child mortality in such processes of development.
Our normative analysis complements recent papers that provide full-fledged
positive analyses of policies to combat child labor. Doepke and Zilibotti (2005)
develop a model in which adults compete with children in the labor market and
so may support a ban on child labor, unless their own working children provide
a large fraction of family income. In this setting, a ban can be triggered by skill-
biased technological change. This induces parents to choose smaller families.
The model replicates features of the history of the United Kingdom in the 19th
century. Krueger and Tjornhom (2005) examine a heterogeneous-agent general
equilibrium model with a human capital externality. They show how the welfare
consequences for individual households of a transition to policies that restrict child
labor or provide tax-financed free education depend crucially on whether house-
holds have financial assets, or earn high or low wages. Finally, Galor and Moav
(2006) show that increasing returns to human capital and the complementarity
between physical and human capital in production create incentives for capitalists
to design a tax policy that would generate universal schooling, and thus a reduction
in child labor.5
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100508080036
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 21:17:26, subject to the Cambridge Core
CHILD LABOR AND THE EDUCATION OF A SOCIETY 223
Turning to empirical work on child labor and schooling, Grootaert and
Kanbur (1995) and Maitra and Ray (2002) are comparative, cross-country studies.
Edmonds (2000) points to a close relationship between child labor and home
production, which can affect the policy recommendations drawn from models of
child labor with parental preferences or credit constraints. Emerson and Souza
(2003) provide evidence concerning the nature and persistence of child labor.
There is also a substantial empirical literature on how child labor is connected
with low income and lack of human capital accumulation; see, e.g., Grootaert
and Kanbur (1995), Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997), Psacharopoulos (1997),
Rosenzweig (1990), and Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model, which
draws on Uzawa (1965) and is of the OLG variety. It starts with the technology
for producing human capital and output, analyzes the household’s behavior, and
then derives the system’s dynamics. Section 3 addresses the policy problem.
The first-best solution can be attained by means of compulsory schooling, the
precise schedule of which is derived for the case where the education technology
is convex. The difficulties of implementing it are briefly discussed. All of the
second-best solutions involve finding a program of taxes and income subsidies
that will minimize the time needed for all households to attain a level of human
capital such that either all children attend school full time or sustainable growth is
ensured, subject to certain constraints on how much inequality can be tolerated. In
Section 4, we analyze in detail the second-best, minimum-time program to educate
the whole society when there is no limit on the degree of temporary inequality.
The political economy of its implementation is taken up in Section 5. The paper
concludes with a discussion of some aspects of development policy in the light of
our findings and identifies a number of open issues.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
Consider an OLG model in which individuals live for two periods, which will be
labeled childhood and adulthood, respectively. Each generation is the same size
and consists of a continuum of households represented by [0, 1].6 A household is
indexed by i or j , where i, j ∈ [0, 1]. In the basic model, all households are alike
and we drop indices.
In the absence of premature mortality, and assuming assortative mating, each
household, or “family”, may be taken to comprise one adult and one child (hence-
forth, mother and daughter). Let the proportion of childhood devoted to education
in period t (t = 0, 1, . . .) be denoted by et ∈ [0, 1], the residual being allocated
to work. An adult is endowed with 1 + q units of time, of which the proportion
q/(1+q) is devoted to child-rearing and the remainder to work. For simplicity, it is
assumed that these proportions are fixed. Given that one unit of time is devoted to
work, let an adult in period t supply λt efficiency units of labor, where λt ∈ [1,∞)
is a natural measure of her human capital, and the condition λ = 1 for the society
as a whole can be thought of as a state of economic backwardness.
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2.1. The Technology
Human capital is assumed to be formed through a process in which child-rearing
is combined with formal education in the following way. In the course of rearing
her daughter, the adult gives the child a certain capacity to build human capital for
adulthood, the size of which is assumed to be related to the adult’s own human
capital. The adult’s gift will be unavailing to preserve the child from the state of
λ = 1 as an adult, however, unless it is complemented by some formal education.
Hence, let the child’s endowment of efficiency units of labor on reaching adulthood
at time t + 1 be given by
λt+1 = h(et ) · (zλt ) + 1, (1)
where z can be thought of as a transmission factor and the educational “technology”
h(.) is assumed to be a continuous, strictly increasing, and differentiable function
on [0, 1), with h(0) = 0. Equation (1) implies that the gift of rearing and formal
education are both necessary if human capital is to exceed the basic level λ = 1
in the next generation.7
For any sequence of formal education {et }∞t=0, the intergenerational growth rate
of the adult’s human capital in a given household in period t , gt , is given by
1 + gt = λt+1/λt = zh(et ) + (1/λt ). (2)
The level of λ is momentarily stationary; i.e., λt+1 = λt , for all pairs (λt , et )
satisfying
[1 − zh(et )]λt = 1. (3)
One such pair is (λt = 1, et = 0), namely, backwardness. In order to describe the
evolution of human capital, which will be needed later, suppose that et takes the
value of unity for all λt ≥ λa . It is then seen from (2) that if the system starts from
some value of λ ≥ λa , and if the “technology” for (re)producing human capital is
sufficiently productive, in the sense that it satisfies the condition zh(1) ≥ 1, then
λt will tend asymptotically to steady growth at the rate [zh(1) − 1]. In the special
case zh(1) = 1, λt grows without limit, but its growth rate tends asymptotically
to zero. If zh(1) < 1, however, then unbounded growth is impossible.
Having established these pregnant possibilities, we turn to the technology for
producing output, which takes the form of an aggregate consumption good. With
our sights on growth, and in view of the fact that human capital in the above
account is a produced factor of production, let there be a proportional relationship
between output and inputs of labor measured in efficiency units. All output will
then accrue to the household as income.
The child’s contribution to the household’s income is given as follows: Without
any education, the child will supply at most one efficiency unit of labor, because
of the complementarity between the gift received during child-rearing and formal
education. Indeed, it is plausible that the child’s efficiency will be somewhat lower,
ceteris paribus, on grounds of age alone. To reflect these considerations, let the
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child be able to supply γ (1 − et ) efficiency units of labor when the child works
1 − et units of time. It is plausible to assume that γ ∈ (0, 1]; i.e., a child working
full time is at most as productive as an uneducated adult. The household therefore
supplies a total of [λt + (1 − et )γ ] efficiency units of labor to the production of
the aggregate good. Under the above assumption on the technology, the level of
output produced by a household that has endowment λt and chooses et is
yt = α[λt + (1 − et )γ ], (4)
where α ∈ (0,∞) is the (constant) productivity of an efficiency unit of labor. Thus,
we have a so-called AK model, the form of which has a certain affinity to Uzawa’s
(1965) learn-or-do model. Recalling the conditions for λ to grow (asymptotically)
at a steady rate, it is seen at once that, should they hold, output per family will
grow in the same manner if et = 1 ∀t ≥ t ′ for some t ′.
2.2. The Household’s Behavior
Following Basu and Van (1998), it is assumed that all allocative decisions lie
in the adult’s hands. We rule out any bequests at death, so that the whole of
current income, as given by (4), is consumed. The gift of the factor zλt through
rearing is one form of inter vivos transfer. According to (1), however, the second
form, namely, sending the child to school at least part of the time (et > 0), is also
necessary if the child is to enjoy λt+1 > 1 as an adult. Because current consumption
is maximized by choosing et = 0, it follows that the adult’s altruism toward her
child must be sufficiently strong if she does choose et > 0.8
For simplicity, let the child’s consumption be a fixed fraction β ∈ (0, 1] of the
adult’s consumption ct . From (4), we then obtain the family’s budget line in the
space of (ct , et ):
(1 + β)ct + αγ et = α(λt + γ ). (5)
Note that we assume that it is impossible for an adult to borrow against the child’s
future income, which has been justified extensively in the literature (see, e.g.,
Baland and Robinson [2000]). It will also be useful to define
c(λt ) ≡ α(λt + γ )1 + β (6)
and
c(λt ) ≡ αλt1 + β , (7)
which correspond to the consumption levels of the adult choosing et = 0 and
et = 1, respectively. Given the endowment λt , her feasible set in the space of
(ct , λt+1) is the set S(λt ), defined as
S(λt ) = {(ct , λt+1) : (1 + β)ct + αγh−1[(λt+1 − 1)/zλt ] ≤ α(λt + γ ),
0 ≤ ct ≤ c(λt ), 1 ≤ λt+1 ≤ (zλt ) · h(1) + 1 }. (8)
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FIGURE 1. The household’s feasible set.
The set S(λt ) is depicted in Figure 1 as ABCD, whose outer frontier BC is the
locus generated by
λt+1 = (zλt ) · h[(α(λt + γ ) − (1 + β)ct )/αγ ] + 1, ct ∈ [c(λt ), c(λt )] (9)
and, purely for the purposes of illustration, h(et ) is assumed to be strictly concave.
It is clear from (6), (7), and (9) that an increase in λt enlarges the feasible set in
such a way that it strictly dominates the set associated with the starting level of λt .
There is also a substitution effect, for BC becomes steeper as λt increases. At any
interior solution, it follows that λt+1 is increasing in λt if λt+1 is a normal good.
Let the adult’s preference ordering be representable by the continuous, strictly
increasing, differentiable, strictly quasi-concave function u(ct , λt+1),9 and con-
sider the problem
max
(ct ,et )
{u(ct , λt+1)} (10)
s.t. [ct , λt+1(et )] ∈ S(λt )
et ∈ [0, 1]
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If h(et ) is a concave function, this problem will have a unique solution, denoted
by [c0(λt ), e0(λt )], which is continuous in λt .10 In what follows, we often use the
notation (c0t , e0t ) as a convenient abbreviation for [c0(λt ), e0(λt )].
We make the following assumptions regarding the optimal choices (c0t , e0t ).
First, if λt is very small, the family’s existence will be so precarious that there
may be no option but to put the child to work full time. At sufficiently high
values, altruism will be operative, in the sense that the parent will choose et > 0.
Therefore, we assume that there exists a critical value λS > 1 such that
[c0(λt ), e0(λt )] = [c(λt ), 0] ∀ λt ≤ λS
e0(λt ) > 0 ∀ λt > λS.
(11)
The critical value λS is a limit that must be exceeded if altruism is to be operative.11
Associated with λS is the level of consumption:
c(λS) = α(λ
S + γ )
1 + β . (12)
Second, there exists a threshold value λa > λS such that
[c0(λt ), e0(λt )] = [c(λt ), 1] ∀ λt ≥ λa. (13)
The value λa can be thought of as marking the beginning of such affluence that
the whole of childhood is spent at the school desk.
Third, it is assumed that the optimal choice e0t is monotonically increasing in
λt for all λt ∈ (λS, λa).12
Before the difference equation (1) is analyzed, a remark should be made about
the choice of the domain of the adult’s preferences. An alternative would involve
preferences over current consumption and the child’s utility. In this case, the
adult cares directly about the well-being of the child, though she knows that her
daughter, as an adult, will care about her own child, and so forth. As in Barro
(1974), therefore, all generations are effectively connected. In such a setting,
by increasing the time devoted to schooling, the adult in period t enlarges her
daughter’s feasible set in such a way that the latter is always better off as a
result, given that the daughter, too, will be confronted with the same problem of
balancing current consumption in period t + 1 against her own daughter’s well-
being in period t + 2. Thus, each adult’s utility depends upon the whole sequence
of utilities achieved by her descendants. We expect that this alternative formulation
would yield results qualitatively similar to those obtained here. Our formulation
of preferences appears to be equally plausible and is much easier to handle in a
technical sense.
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2.3. Dynamics
Returning to (1) in the light of (11) and (13), we obtain
λit+1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 ∀ λit ≤ λS
zh
[
e0
(
λit
)]
λit + 1 ∀ λit ∈ (λS, λa)
zh(1)λit + 1 ∀ λit ≥ λa,
(14)
which yields the following results:
PROPOSITION 1.
(i) λ = 1 is a locally stable equilibrium.
(ii) If zh(1) ≥ 1, then starting from any λ ≥ λa, λit will grow without bound.
(iii) If zh(1)λa + 1 ≥ λa , there exists at least one stationary value of λ, denoted by λ∗,
in (λS, λa]. Otherwise, there need be no such value.
(iv) If zh(1) < 1 and zh(1)λa + 1 > λa , there exists a steady-state value of λ, λ∗∗ =
1/[1 − zh(1)] > λa , such that λ∗∗ is a stable, stationary equilibrium ∀λit ≥ λa .
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix.
Henceforth, the cases zh(1) ≥ 1 and zh(1) < 1 will be called the growth and
nongrowth cases, respectively.
The number of stationary values in the interval (λS, λa), and hence the char-
acter of the system’s dynamical behavior, depends on the shape of the function
h(e0(λt ))λt . Although there is no space here to attempt a full characterization, a
brief sketch will convey the flavor of the possibilities. Define
f (λ) ≡ h[e0(λ)]λ, λ ∈ (λS, λa),
where it is clear that f (·) is increasing in λ in the interval (λS, λa). Differentiating
twice, we have
f ′′ = 2h′e′ + h′′(e′)2λ + h′e′′λ.
If h′′ ≥ 0 and e′′ ≥ 0, then f is convex everywhere on (λS, λa). If, however, h(·)
and e0(·) are strictly concave, then f ′′ < 0 cannot be ruled out over the interval
(λS, λa). One possibility is that f (·) is first strictly concave and then strictly
convex on (λS, λa), so that there will be an odd number of stationary values in
that interval in the growth case.
In order to see what all this portends for the behavior of λt , we illustrate the
trajectory of λt for the growth case when there is a single stationary value of λ in
the interval (λS, λa) (see Figure 2). The 45◦ line through the origin is labeled a; the
line g represents λt+1 = zh(1)λt + 1, where g’s slope is zh(1)≥ 1. The horizontal
segment BC reflects the fact that λt+1 = 1 for all λt ∈ [1, λS]. The rising segment
that passes through D and then meets g at λa arises from λt+1 = zh[e0(λt )]λt + 1
for all λt ∈ (λS, λa). The instability of the stationary state corresponding to λt = λ∗
is evident from the trajectories drawn to the left and right of D, respectively.13
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FIGURE 2. Growth case with two steady states.
3. THE POLICY PROBLEM
In this section, we formulate the policy problem associated with an initial state of
backwardness, where the broad objective of policy is to liberate all lineages from
this condition for good. The case for intervention in the present setting rests on the
externalities that arise when the improvements in all future generations’ welfare
that would stem from better education of today’s children are not fully reflected in
the preferences of today’s parents. This holds in our model because parents care
about their children’s human capital, but not about what happens subsequently. If,
as is arguable, the government has a longer horizon than individual households,
then the case for intervention to promote schooling at the expense of child labor
is, in principle, established.14
The instruments available to the government for this purpose are assumed to
be compulsory schooling and taxes and subsidies. The government is assumed
to be able both to identify each household (or lineage), an ability that is vital to
the payment of subsidies in an efficient way, and to assess its current level of full
income. Because an adult’s income is fixed in a particular period, a tax thereon is
effectively lump-sum in nature, so that given the government’s general objective,
first-best allocations are, in principle, attainable. If compulsory schooling cannot
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be enforced, or providing a program of sufficiently generous subsidies to attend
school lies beyond the government’s administrative and fiscal capacities, then one
is driven to second-best solutions based on a combination of taxes and general
income support. The effects of imposing further restrictions on the tax schedule
will be briefly discussed after the main results have been derived.
In view of the emphasis on growth, we concentrate in what follows on the case
where zh(1) > 1 and, for simplicity, there is a single stationary value of λ in the
interval (λS, λa), as depicted in Figure 2.
3.1. First-Best Policy
As a benchmark, consider the case where the government is able to determine
directly how much each family consumes and the schooling its child receives,
subject only to the requirement that each family obtain at least the subsistence
minimum, which is defined to be csub for the consumption of adults and βcsub for
children. This minimum imposes an upper limit on the family’s taxable capac-
ity. We formulate the policy objective as minimizing the number of generations
(periods) needed for the economy to attain a condition of self-sustaining growth
in which compliance with full-time schooling occurs voluntarily. Formally, we
define the policy problem P0 as
P0 : min
{(cit ,eit )}t=0,1,...
{T }
s.t. cit ≥ csub, eit ∈ [0, 1], and λiT ≥ λa ∀i, t.
We assume that the government can impose schooling and redistribute consump-
tion goods subject to the aggregate resource constraint and cit ≥ csub. For the
problem to be interesting, a family must have some taxable capacity, denoted by
τ ba , when λi = 1:
τ ba ≡ α(1 + γ ) − (1 + β)csub > 0, (15)
where it is plausible that τ ba is small, because households with λt = 1 may already
be close to the subsistence level.
PROPOSITION 2. If h(et ) is strictly concave, then starting from a condition of
backwardness, the policy problem (P0) is solved by a monotonic program in which
all children in each generation receive the same schooling, that is, eit = ejt ∀i, j
and ∀t ∈ {0, · · · , T }, with eit+1 > eit if eit < 1.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix.
It is natural to ask whether the above program can be implemented by means of a
suitable combination of taxes and subsidies. In view of the externality generated by
education, let the government subsidize attendance at school and levy lump-sum
taxes to finance the resulting outlays. Because all families remain identical under
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the program, the index i may be dropped, and the budget line of any household in
period t may be written as
(1 + β)ct + (αγ − σt )et = α(λt + γ ) − τt ,
where σt is the subsidy paid on each unit of schooling and τt is a poll tax. By
setting σt = αγ ∀t , the government will induce the family to choose e0t = 1, for
the net opportunity cost of education is then zero. The program must, however, be
financially feasible without violating ct ≥ csub. In period 0, therefore, the subsidy
rate σ = αγ is offered, up to a maximum payment of τ0 = τ ba . In such a situation,
the family will choose exactly the optimum bundle derived in Proposition 2. The
process is then continued for as many periods as needed, with τt being updated as
λt grows.15
We now briefly discuss the character of the optimal program when h(·) is
convex. If h(·) is linear, it is clear that the proof of Proposition 2 will still go
through. If h(·) is strictly convex, however, then considerations of inequality may
become relevant if (P0) is not soluble within one generation. For suppose h′ is
close to zero until e nears unity and then rises sharply: that is, education pays off
handsomely only after a substantial threshold has been reached. In this case, it
may well be better to educate some children fully in period 0 and then tax them
heavily as adults in order to finance the education in period 1 of the offspring of
those whose education was neglected in period 0. As we will see in the sections
that follow, such schemes of redistribution across lineages are an essential feature
of second-best programs based on general income support.
We close this analysis of the first-best with a discussion of the practical difficul-
ties of implementing it. Many developing countries lack the central institutions and
bureaucratic morale to ensure the truthful reporting of school attendance or to call
the parents to book when the truants are reported. Large-scale “truancy” among
teachers is also a problem, as the evidence in the World Development Report
on the provision of public services [World Bank (2003)] vividly demonstrates.
When compulsion is actually needed, there are correspondingly strong incentives
for collusion between parents and teachers to exaggerate school attendance. The
problems of enforcing compulsory schooling may also appear in connection with
school attendance subsidies. The claims put in by numerous parents have to be
verified frequently, and the incentives for teachers to report the children’s atten-
dance truthfully are weak; but the strong incentives for collusion remain.16 In view
of these difficulties, the remainder of the paper will be concerned with settings in
which the first-best solution is not attainable, so that the government must resort
to blunter instruments to achieve the goal set out above.
3.2. Second-Best Taxes and Subsidies
Observe from (8) and Figure 1 that a lump-sum subsidy will induce a parallel shift
of BC to the right. The normality of λt+1 implies that, for a given level of λt , such
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a shift will result in an increase in e0t for all λt ∈ (λS, λa) and, if the subsidy is
large enough, also for all λt ∈ [1, λS]. Hence the obvious next-best alternative is
to provide families with what can be termed income support. This may take the
form not only of direct transfers, if such are possible, but also of projects such
as local infrastructure or the introduction of improved varieties of certain crops,
whose benefits are reaped by particular groups or communities. As will become
clear, second-best interventions lead to two characteristic results: first, the problem
cannot be solved in one generation; and second, a solution, if one exists, always
involves some inequality, if only temporarily.
For simplicity, we assume that taxes are solely a function of the income or
human capital of adults.17 Let τ it = τt (λit ) denote the tax levied in period t on
household i, where τ it ≥ 0 ∀i, t . Some fraction of the population will be subsidized
out of the ensuing revenues. We denote by sit = sit (λit ) the subsidy household i
will receive in period t if the adult has λit , where it should be noted that the subsidy
depends on the index i directly, as well as indirectly through λit . The net income
of household i in period t is
wit = αλit + α
(
1 − eit
)
γ + sit
(
λit
)− τt(λit) ≡ wiat + α(1 − eit )γ, (16)
where wiat denotes the net disposable income accruing to the adult in question.
The household’s net tax burden is defined by
υit
(
λit
) ≡ τt(λit)− sit (λit).
Throughout the remainder of the paper, households are either taxed or subsidized,
and therefore τt (λit ) and sit (λit ) are net transfers. The evolution of human capital
accumulation then follows the same logic as in Section 2.2. Recalling that an in-
crease in λt both enlarges the set S(λt ) and makes its outer frontier BC everywhere
steeper, the adult’s choice of eit is written as a function of both λit and υit :
ei0t = e0
(
λit , υ
i
t
)
.
Note that taxation need not differ across households that have the same taxable
income. Subsidization, however, can and must be made dependent on income and
the particular type of household. Although, in the end, only the net tax υit (λit )
matters for household i, the distinction between taxation and subsidization will be
useful in illustrating the working of different policies.
The maximum tax that can be obtained from any household is the difference
between its full income and (1+β)csub. The tax burden of household i is therefore
assumed to be constrained by
αλit − τt
(
λit
)+ αγ ≥ (1 + β)csub ∀ i. (17)
There may, of course, be further restrictions on the governments’ ability to tax; for
example, that post-tax income be everywhere strictly increasing in pretax income.
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We assume that in drawing up programs, the society has to rely fully on its own
fiscal resources.18 To formulate the budget constraints of the society as a whole,
we reinterpret the indexation of households as a real-valued function on [0, 1] that
assigns every household its human capital in a particular period. Then denoting
total government revenues in period t by Bt , the budget constraint is given by
Bt =
∫ 1
0
τt
(
λit
)
di ≥
∫ 1
0
sit
(
λit
)
di. (18)
3.3. Policy Programs
A program of taxation and subsidization is to be chosen to bring the society out
of backwardness in a sustainable way. There are several ways to formulate such a
policy. Starting in period 0, let T denote the number of periods needed to bring all
adults to at least the efficiency level λa .19 Because an increase in λt yields a strictly
preferred set S(λt ), we work with a simple measure of inequality, namely20
t = max
i,j
(
wiat − wjat
)
. (19)
All the formulations of the policy problem considered here involve minimizing T
subject to some upper bound on the degree of inequality a society is prepared to
tolerate. They can therefore be regarded as “turnpike” programs. The first is
P1 : min
{(τt (λit ),sit (λit ))}t=0,1,...
{T }
s.t. λt ≤ , (17), (18), and λiT ≥ λa ∀i, t,
where  is the said upper bound on t . A special case of the policy problem (P1)
is that where  = ∞, which seeks the fastest path unconstrained by inequality
to the state in which all adults have at least the efficiency level λa . Observe that
when all adults attain λa and none is subject to taxation, then all of their offspring
will enjoy full-time schooling, and so attain at least λa .
Whereas policy problem (P1) focuses on inequality during the course of the
program, others can be formulated that focus on the degree of long-run inequality
that prevails after the program has been completed. Such an alternative policy
problem can be stated as follows:
P2 : min
{(τt (λit ),sit (λit ))}t=0,1,...
{T }
s.t. T ≤ , (17), (18) and λiT ≥ λa, ∀i, t.
Policy problem (P2) seeks the optimal speed program such that inequality is at
most  at the moment when the society becomes fully educated. An important
special case of (P2) is  = 0, where no long-run inequality is allowed.
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Other formulations are possible. In particular, we think that the following prob-
lem is relevant:
P3 : min
{(τt (λit ),sit (λit ))}t=0,1,...
{T }
s.t. t ≤ , (17), (18), λiT ≥ λa and eit+1 ≥ eit , ∀i, t.
In (P3) we impose the additional constraint on (P1) that the time spent in school
by members of a particular lineage does not decline over time. On economic and
on political economy grounds, this appears to be a sensible implicit restriction on
the tax schedule. Imposing such a restriction can increase the time a society needs
to escape backwardness.
3.4. The Inequality–Speed Dilemma
The above formulation of the policy problem involves a potential inequality–speed
dilemma, which we now investigate. We assume that each household, viewed as
a lineage, receives a positive subsidy only once.21 To simplify the exposition,
we also assume that the tax levied on those households that are in a state of
backwardness and are taxed is τ ba.22 That being so, our first observation is obvious:
Fact 1. In an initial state of backwardness, equal treatment of citizens with
respect to taxes and subsidies leaves the whole society in that state.
Equal treatment in period 0 would imply that each household would have a
disposable income of α(1 + γ ), which leads to ei00 = 0 and hence to λi1 = 1 ∀i.
No household can escape from backwardness at any time under such a policy.
Having observed that creating inequality, if only temporarily, is a necessary
condition to increase human capital, we now discuss how much inequality is
needed if the whole society is to be educated. Because λit remains at unity until
household i receives a subsidy and must reach at least λ∗ in the period immediately
afterward if it is not to revert to λi = 1, it follows that an escape from the poverty
trap is possible only if there exists an sit such that
zh
[
e0
(
1,−sit
)]+ 1 ≥ λ∗. (20)
Let the smallest value of sit that satisfies (20) be denoted by s˜, where it should
be noted that s˜ is independent of both i and t .
In period t = 0, the government’s total revenue is τ ba(1 − δ0), where δ0 is the
share of households that receive subsidies. The share of households that can be
given the subsidy s˜ is therefore
˜δ0 ≡ τ
ba
s˜ + τ ba . (21)
It follows that
wia0 =
{
α + s˜ i ∈ [0, ˜δ0]
α − τ ba i ∈ ( ˜δ0, 1].
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FIGURE 3. The optimum when λ = λ∗.
Hence, when the subsidy is s˜, 0 = s˜ + τ ba , which yields the following
result:
PROPOSITION 3. If  < s˜+τ ba and λi0 = 1 ∀i, then the policy problem (P1)
yields T = ∞.
We now examine whether this result holds in the case where  ≥ s˜ + τ ba . In
view of the above argument, the first step is to establish how large s˜ is in relation
to λ∗, where
λ∗ = zh[e0(λ∗, 0)]λ∗ + 1. (22)
This is depicted in Figure 3 as the point E on the frontier BC corresponding to
λ = λ∗. Because c(λ∗) = α(λ∗ + γ )/(1 + β), it follows that the effect of giving a
net transfer in the amount of α(λ∗ − 1) to a household whose adult human capital
is unity is to shift the outer frontier of its feasible set in such a way that point B is
just feasible. The remainder of the said frontier, BF , lies below BC by virtue of
λ∗ > 1, which at once yields the result that the net transfer α(λ∗ − 1) is too small
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100508080036
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 21:17:26, subject to the Cambridge Core
236 CLIVE BELL AND HANS GERSBACH
to induce λit+1 = λ∗ when λit = 1. Hence,
s˜ > α(λ∗ − 1).
The special case where  = s˜+τ ba turns out to be of considerable importance;
for it permits λ∗ to be attained in the next generation, but no more than that level.
PROPOSITION 4. If  = s˜ + τ ba and λi0 = 1 ∀i, then the policy problem (P1)
yields T = ∞.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the Appendix.
Propositions 3 and 4 have profound implications for the tradeoff between speed
and income inequality. The society must be prepared to tolerate a greater degree
of inequality in incomes than  = s˜ + τ ba; and at some stage, some households
must possess human capital in excess of λ∗ while others are still in the state λ = 1,
if all are eventually to escape from backwardness in finite time. Propositions 3
and 4 are in the nature of “impossibility” results. They evidently remain valid if
the government’s ability to raise taxes is restricted beyond the basic requirement
that all lineages can at least survive, as expressed by condition (17).
To complete this section, we need to say something about the case where
¯ > s˜ + τ ba . This easing of the restriction on inequality permits si0 > s˜, and
hence λi1 > λ∗ for some i. Household i can now pay some taxes in period 1,
while still choosing ei01 such that λi2 > λ∗ and without violating 1 ≤ ¯. The
taxable capacity so generated in period 1 undermines the argument in the proof of
Proposition 4, and so opens up the possibility of a “bootstrap” operation, in which
those lineages that receive a subsidy early on later pay the taxes needed to draw
up the rest behind them. This possibility will now be explored in detail.
4. NO LIMITS ON TEMPORARY INEQUALITY
To focus on essentials, we begin by examining the special case of policy problem
(P1) when no upper limit on temporary inequality is imposed ( = ∞). That
is, we seek a policy yielding the swiftest possible attainment of a fully educated
society. We assume that
zh(1) + 1 ≥ λa. (23)
Condition (23) states that if an adult in a state of backwardness were to educate her
child fully, the child would choose full-time education for her own child, provided
she herself were not taxed as an adult. This condition simplifies the analysis, but
is not essential to our argument. It ensures that (P1) could, in principle, be solved
in two periods: if those households singled out in period 0 for promotion from
backwardness receive a subsidy sufficiently large to induce them to choose e0 = 1,
then their offspring will attain at least λa , and so provide a new tax base in period 1.
If this tax base is large enough to subsidize all other households to the point where
the latter choose e1 = 1 in period 1, then (P1) will have been solved in two
periods.
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The tax–subsidy problem is complex and no closed-form solution exists that
covers all possible periods T for which (P1) has a solution. Therefore, we proceed
by considering the optimal policy for a given number of periods within which the
entire society can be educated, ascending from T = 1. We establish conditions
and optimal policies under the assumption that a particular period, say T , is the
outcome under (P1). If the solution does not yield T , we move to T + 1 and look
once more. Starting from T = 1 and using this method of induction, we will be
able to characterize sequentially the solution under (P1). In the next section, we
explore the case where all lineages can escape from backwardness within two
generations. The extension to the case where the process takes three or more
generations is set out in a technical appendix to Bell and Gersbach (2001). The
consequences of the restrictions on the tax function τ it (·) implied by (P3) are taken
up in Section 4.3.
4.1. Minimum Time: Two Periods
We first note that T = 1 can never be the outcome under (P1), because in t = 0
only a fraction of the society can receive positive net transfers such that the adults
in t = 1 will have achieved λa . The first possibility, then, is to escape from
backwardness in two periods. In t = 0, suppose that the share of households with
i ∈ [0, δ0] will be subsidized. The total subsidy to this group of families is given
by
si0 =
1 − δ0
δ0
τ ba ≡ s0, (24)
which implies the following pattern of human capital formation:
λi1 =
{
zh[e0(1,−s0)] + 1 if i ∈ [0, δ0]
1 if i ∈ (δ0, 1].
(25)
To solve the problem in two periods, the tax–subsidy scheme in t = 1 must fulfill
λi2 =
{
zh
{
e0
[
λi1, τ1
(
λi1
)]}
λi1 + 1 ≥ λa if i ∈ [0, δ0]
zh
[
e0
(
1,−si1
)]+ 1 ≥ λa if i ∈ (δ0, 1] (26)
and the financing constraint
δ0τ1 ≥ (1 − δ0)s1, (27)
where the superscript i may be dropped without ambiguity in (27) by virtue of
the fact that both groups are homogeneous. For each value of λi1 (i ∈ [0, δ0]), let
τˆ1(λ
i
1) denote the maximum tax that household i can pay without violating the
upper branch of (26). Becauseλi1 is uniquely determined by δ0 through s0, it follows
that for each choice of δ0 ∈ [0, 1], we obtain a unique λi1 (i ∈ [0, δ0]) and a unique
τˆ1(λ
i
1). For each s1 that satisfies the lower branch of (26), {δ0τˆ1[λi1(δ0)]−(1−δ0)s1}
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is also a continuous function. Consider, therefore, the following problem:
max
0≤δ0≤1
(
δ0τˆ1
{
λi1[s0(δ0)]
}− (1 − δ0)s1) i ∈ [0, δ0]. (28)
Because the objective function is continuous and δ0 ∈ [0, 1], a solution exists and
is denoted by ˆδ0. We obtain
PROPOSITION 5. If ˆδ0τˆ1(λi1(s0( ˆδ0))) − (1 − ˆδ0)s1 ≥ 0, then T = 2 is the
outcome of policy problem (P1) with  = ∞. In particular, the subsidy sˆ0 =
(1 − ˆδ0)τ ba/ ˆδ0 to the households i ∈ [0, ˆδ0] in period zero ensures that T = 2.
The preceding analysis highlights the point that two considerations enter into the
determination of ˆδ0 or, equivalently, of sˆ0. First, how large is the taxable capacity
in the next period yielded by subsidizing a fraction of households in the present
period, a capacity expressed by δ0τ1{λi1[s0(δ0)]}? Second, how large is the burden
of future subsidies needed to promote the rest, as expressed by (1 − δ0)s1?
Proposition 5 carries a number of further implications. First, if T = 2 under
(P1), there will not, in general, be a unique optimal tax and subsidy policy. For
suppose that the budget surplus in the second period is positive, ˆδ0 τ1
{
λi1 [s0( ˆδ0)]
}−
(1− ˆδ0)s1 > 0, and denote by δ0 one value of the share of subsidized persons in the
first period for which the above financing constraint, (27), holds as an equality.23
Then there exists a continuum of solutions for δ0 and s0(δ0) with δ0 ∈ [δ0, ˆδ0] and
s0 given by (24).
Second, to resolve this nonuniqueness, additional considerations can be brought
into the reckoning. An obvious choice is to minimize inequality. Let attention be
confined, to start with, to the first period (t = 0). Because 0 = s0 + τ ba , the
problem is as follows:
min
δ0∈[0,1]
s0 s.t. (24)–(27). (29)
Observe from (25) that minimizing s0 entails minimizing λi1 (i ∈ [0, δ0]) and
hence also τ1. It is seen from (24) that minimizing s0 is also equivalent to maxi-
mizing δ0. It follows that if problem (29) possesses a solution, it will be unique.
Denote the solution by δ00, so that
s00 =
1 − δ00
δ00
τ ba.
Now recall from the lower branch of (26) that when the subsidy s1 is the
minimum net transfer needed to yield λ2 = λa for the group supported in period 1,
it imposes the smallest fiscal burden in period 1 if the number of families to be
promoted is also a minimum, from which it also follows that the tax in period 1
on each family promoted in period 0, τ i1 (i ∈ [0, δ0]), is a minimum, too. That
the solution to (29) entails minimizing the number of families to be promoted in
period 1 therefore motivates
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PROPOSITION 6. If the solution of policy problem (P1) with  = ∞ yields
T = 2, then the solution of problem (29), δ00 , yields minimum inequality in both
periods, with no inequality (λi2 = λa ∀ i) in the second.
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in the Appendix.
It should be remarked that the argument will go through perfectly well even
if the upper frontiers are not concave everywhere, provided the optimum bundle
(c01, λ
0
2) is always unique.
The third implication of Proposition 5 is that although income inequality is
temporarily created in order to escape from the state of low productivity, there
need be no inequality in human capital, and hence no inequality in future income,
at the end of the two-period program. A subset of the programs in Proposition 5 and
the program in Proposition 6 therefore have the desirable feature that although
initially identical households are treated differently with respect to taxes and
subsidies in the first period, their offspring become identical once more in the next
period, and enter the stage of continuous growth as such. Hence, the apparently
highly restrictive constraint T = 0 is not binding for (P2) if T = 2 is the outcome
of (P1). This observation can easily be generalized to the case where T ≥ 3, as
we now show.
4.2. An Equivalence between (P1) and (P2)
We claim that if (17) is the only restriction placed on taxes, then second-best,
maximal-speed programs can always avoid long-run inequality, in the sense that
all lineages attain the same level of human capital at the conclusion of such
programs. The following corollary is proved in the Appendix.
COROLLARY 1. Suppose that {τ ∗t (λit ), s∗it (λit )} is a solution of (P1) for
 = ∞, with minimum time T . Then T is also the minimum time of (P2) with
T = 0.
4.3. Persistent Inequality
The preceding corollary shows that long-run inequalities can be avoided, but it
implies that the schooling of children of educated adults in period T − 1 must
be so limited that their human capital as adults will be exactly λa in period T .
Yet this might be politically implausible or even impossible, because the implied
range of income over which the marginal tax rate is 100% could be very large.
Policy problem (P3) addresses this difficulty by imposing the constraint that
et be nondecreasing within each lineage. This is equivalent to imposing certain
restrictions on the tax function τ it (·). It will now be shown by means of an example
that the optimal program for policy problem (P3) can require more time to attain
the goal of λa for the whole population than problem (P2), and may result in
income inequalities that persist beyond the program’s horizon.
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Consider the case of symmetric Stone–Geary preferences in the form
u =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(c − g) (zλ · h(e) + 1) + (g − csub) if c ≥ g
c − csub if g ≥ c ≥ csub
−∞ otherwise.
Consumption must be at least csub for “survival,” and full income per equivalent
adult must exceed the amount g if any schooling is to occur. Let the educational
technology take the form h(e) = b · e, and consider the following constellation
of parameter values: α = 0.16, β = 1, γ = 0.7, csub = 0.1, g = 0.14, z = 0.7
and b = 5.05. As established in Bell and Gersbach (2001), this example yields
the claimed result.
4.4. An Algorithm for Maximal Speed
We complete this section by generalizing the procedure for finding programs that
will bring about a fully educated society in the least possible time.
The previous sections indicate how maximal speed programs have to be de-
signed. Ascending from T = 1, one can establish necessary and sufficient condi-
tions that the least time be a particular period, say T . We summarize the procedure
as follows:
CHARACTERIZATION OF MAXIMAL SPEED PROGRAMS
A least-time optimal program starting from t = 0 spans T periods if and only if
there exists a sequence of tax-and-transfer schemes such that
(i) all households attain at least λa in period T ;
(ii) there is no budget deficit in period T −1 and there are balanced budgets in all previous
periods;
(iii) no such program exists for T − 1 periods.
A formal description of the algorithm is given in Bell and Gersbach (2001).
Although the principle underlying the procedure for deriving speed programs is
outlined above, there are further considerations when we move to longer time-
horizons.
An important feature of maximal speed programs is that school attendance
rates in all but the last period are not maximized. Indeed, the preceding results
imply that distributing subsidies more broadly to increase the number of children
at school in any particular period can lead to a return to poverty in the future,
because the succeeding cohorts of these lineages will not attend school to the
same extent, if at all. A second feature of such programs is that the indeterminacy
of tax-and-transfer schemes increases as T increases, which opens the door to the
use of additional criteria for judging inequality.
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4.5. Endogenous Fertility
As demonstrated by Raut and Srinivasan (1994), endogenous fertility can sig-
nificantly affect the dynamics of OLG models. Allowing households to choose
fertility (nt ) in our framework, with preferences represented by a utility func-
tion u(ct , nt , λt+1), would introduce the familiar quantity–quality tradeoff. Our
sequences of tax–subsidy schemes can be adapted to this case, but at the cost of
a tremendously expanded technical apparatus. The main consequences of such an
extension for our results can be summarized as follows.
Suppose fertility increases with the adult’s income, so that the dependency
ratio rises, too.24 Then the required subsidy to promote the escape from the
poverty trap becomes larger and, initially at least, fewer households can receive
subsidies, which reduces the speed toward a fully educated society. However, the
fact that such households have more children implies a larger future tax base, so it
increases the speed with which the remaining poor households will be pulled up.
The acceleration will continue over the following generations. Exactly the opposite
effects occur when fertility declines with rising income. Thus, introducing fertility
decisions does not affect the basic logic of our dynamic tax/subsidy schemes, but
it does introduce further static and dynamic feedback effects that impinge on the
speed with which optimal programs achieve full education.
5. POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we briefly address the positive question of whether second-best
policies are likely to be implemented. Whether overcoming poverty can and will
occur under democracy will depend crucially on the specific constitutional rules
for setting the agenda and taking decisions. When, as in this paper, the level of
an adult’s human capital is fixed by past decisions, a democracy with simple
majority rule and equal agenda-setting rights will not achieve universal literacy
and growth. To establish this claim, suppose a subset of households start to educate
their children. If they form a minority, these families will be taxed at very high rates
in the next voting round, when uneducated individuals will form a majority. As
a consequence, although an initial education-enhancing redistribution may occur
(the winners might be chosen by lottery), its effect will be destroyed through time.
If, conversely, the said subset form a majority, then they will be able to block any
redistributive measures in favor of the minority left in illiteracy and poverty in the
first round.
There are, however, democratic constitutions with specific sets of rules that
do enable a democracy to produce an educated society. A constitution involving
the simple-majority rule, a tax-protection rule, and a rotating agenda-setting rule
may achieve this objective.25 The tax-protection rule, if it limits marginal tax
rates sufficiently, ensures that educated households do not fall back into poverty.
Rotating agenda-setting ensures that all uneducated individuals will have the power
to determine the agenda at some point in time. As agenda setters can channel
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subsidies to themselves, such a rule guarantees that all individuals eventually will
be educated. Of course, the speed of human capital accumulation will be lower
under a democracy than under a benevolent dictatorship, as a majority must always
be better off in every voting round, which constrains the set of education-enhancing
proposals.
It should be noted that the tax-protection rule may arise as the outcome of a
cooperative game. If adults can effectively destroy some or all of their endowments,
by emigrating or not working, for example, then there are limits on how punitive
taxation can be. This threat is an essential element in Aumann and Kurz’s (1977)
analysis of taxation under simple majority voting. One of their salient results is
that net income is an increasing function of gross income, with the poor receiving
some income support. Another is that the marginal tax rate will be at least 50%, but
will never reach 100%. Such an endogenous limitation has something in common
with our policy program (P3). Although all members of society will eventually
enjoy a full education, initial inequalities will not necessarily disappear, even in
the long run.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This investigation of the nexus of child labor, economic growth, and inequality
rests largely on the assumption that parents decide on their children’s schooling,
an assumption that can be justified by the enormous difficulties of monitoring and
enforcing school attendance and labor standards [see, for example, Basu and Van
(1998) and Basu (1999)]. Our analysis has yielded several findings, while leaving
a number of issues unsettled.
The main conclusions are, first, that a whole society or group can be mired
in a stable state of ignorance and low productivity, wherein all children work
full-time to supplement their families’ income and, in missing out on schooling,
thereby perpetuate as adults the condition into which they themselves were born.
Second, an escape from this poverty trap into a state of universal literacy and
continuous economic growth is possible through various second-best programs
of redistributive taxes and income support, even without outside aid. Third, the
catch here is that in the absence of outside aid on a sufficiently large scale, such
programs necessarily involve some temporary inequality, and they may result in
long-run inequality if the government is unable to tax the better-off sufficiently
heavily. For the very limited taxable capacity of the economy in its original
state demands that the subsidies thus financed, which are designed to induce
voluntary schooling, must be chosen in such a way as to create additional taxable
capacity in the future. This implies that the beneficiaries’ offspring must attain
a level of education such that their lineages do not slide back into the poverty
trap. Fourth, the necessity of temporary inequality speaks against policies aimed
at bringing about high attendance rates in the short term without giving due
consideration to the long-term perspective within which the problem is to be
solved.
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The possibility of compulsory schooling as a complement to taxes and subsidies
raises some interesting issues where the optimal package of measures is concerned.
Suppose, for example, that child labor can be limited to the point where the family
can just afford the subsistence level of consumption in the absence of any taxation
of income. If the educational technology is convex, a sequence of partial bans
will yield an escape from the trap in minimum time without resort to taxes and
subsidies. If the educational technology is not convex, however, it is not clear
that, when the goal is to bring about a fully educated society in minimum time,
universal compulsory schooling would eliminate the necessity of some degree of
temporary inequality. For inequality can increase taxable capacity, and taxes and
subsidies are also needed to attain the optimum in this case. These matters will
be important in situations where some monitoring and enforcement are possible
under governmental or international standards.
The list of open issues does not end with those arising from compulsory ed-
ucation. First, what other concepts of inequality, both within and across genera-
tions, commend themselves in the evaluation of alternative paths to full literacy?
Second, how should foreign aid be allocated in such a setting? Third, how do
the necessity of employing distortionary taxes and the possibility of tax evasion
affect the complexion, or even the feasibility, of an optimal program? Fourth,
how can credit opportunities for individual households or for the country as a
whole help to decrease the time needed to educate a society? These and other
pressing issues in the area of child labor and education are left as topics for further
research.
NOTES
1. Becker et al. (1990) and Ehrlich and Lui (1991) pioneered this approach based on the direct
transmission of potential productivity from parent to child.
2. The paper is therefore related to some recent literature on economic growth in which the transition
through different regimes is endogenously generated. The initial contributions are those of Galor and
Weil (1999, 2000), who describe, within a unified framework, long-run development processes from
an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth in modern times.
3. There is a large literature on growth and inequality, surveyed in Aghion and Williamson (1998).
This does not, however, deal with the problems of finding a path from one steady state to another, as we
do here. The work of Galor and Zeira (1993) shows that the distribution of wealth matters for economic
growth. At this fundamental level, our paper deals with a similar question to that in the growth and
inequality literature: do short-term or long-run tradeoffs exist between growth and inequality?
4. For an early survey, see Basu (1999).
5. In our model, output is produced by means of human capital alone, so there are no capitalists.
6. We comment on the robustness of our results to endogenous fertility in Section 4.5.
7. The evolution of human capital described in equation (1) is the simplest formulation, be-
cause it does not involve any persistence. Persistence can be introduced by extending equation (1)
to λt+1 = h(et )(zλt ) + 1 + ρλt . For ρ sufficiently small, our analysis should still hold. In future
research, we hope to say more about the case where persistence is large.
8. An alternative possibility is that children are expected to support their parents in old age, with
the contributions becoming more generous with the rising level of the children’s income as adults. To
pursue this possibility, three overlapping generations would be needed.
9. Note that the utility function is defined on the set {(ct , λt+1) : ct ≥ 0, λt+1 ≥ 1}.
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10. If, however, h(·) is strictly convex on some interval—for example, when e is small and the
payoff to additional schooling has yet to become large—the solution need not be unique and the locus
(c0(λt ), e0(λt )) may exhibit a discontinuity at one or more values of λt . This possibility is a distraction
from the main theme of the paper and is ruled out by assumption, whereby it should be remarked that
it is not necessary that h(·) be concave for the solution to be unique.
11. This is equivalent to assuming that, for all λt ≤ λS , the indifference curves are sufficiently
steep where they intersect the horizontal line through λt+1 = 1.
12. The assumption holds if λt+1 is a sufficiently strong luxury good for all λt > λs , and if h(et )
is not too strongly concave. A detailed discussion and justification of the assumption is contained in
our working paper [Bell and Gersbach (2001)].
13. There are further possibilities associated with the non-growth case, which are discussed in Bell
and Gersbach (2001).
14. A detailed discussion of the case for intervention is contained in Bell and Gersbach (2001).
15. Given that the authorities can both observe and condition taxes on et , it is also possible to
devise a nonlinear income tax schedule that will induce families to choose e0t = min [ξt /2, 1] without
any taxes actually being paid.
16. Some decentralized schemes for poor communities, such as Progresa in Mexico, appear to have
overcome the worst of these problems, though at considerable cost to the central fisc. Whether they
can be replicated in other, poorer countries is open to question.
17. This may be justified by the ease of tax evasion for child income. It is unlikely that allowing
household income to be taxable would change the main results that follow.
18. The case where a fixed amount of outside aid is available is discussed in Bell and Gersbach
(2001).
19. As will become clear, the policy problems are formulated in such a way that this level is also
indefinitely sustainable after completion of the programs in question. The requirement to bring the
whole society to (λ∗ + ) for some  > 0 would yield the same qualitative result.
20. Inequality will arise only from differences across groups, so that taking the range of the
distribution as a measure of inequality is defensible. The qualitative nature of our results appears to be
robust with respect to more sophisticated measures of inequality.
21. The proofs of the propositions rely crucially on this assumption. Although the overall con-
clusions are robust if we drop it, the proofs become extremely tedious, and the boundaries for the
inequality measure need to be slightly altered.
22. This assumption permits one to avoid considering the case where poor adults are taxed by an
arbitrarily small amount. Without it, the formulation of Propositions 3 and 4 becomes a bit more more
cumbersome.
23. There may be other solutions. In that case, we take one for which the budget surplus is positive
in the interval [δ0, ˆδ0].
24. It is straightforward to give examples in which fertility can increase or decrease when income
rises from very low levels.
25. Such rules are discussed in Gersbach and Siemers (2005).
26. Equivalent is the case where the population is divided into two and each half is treated
symmetrically.
27. This claim follows from the first-order conditions for the said expression to attain a maximum,
whereby ψ11 = ψ21 , which will hold only by choosing equal treatment in period 0.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Part (i) follows immediately from the assumption that λS > 1. Part (ii) follows at once from
the third part of (14). To prove part (iii), observe that because zh(e0(λit ))λit is a continuous
function, it follows from λit+1 = 1 ∀λit ≤ λS and λit+1(λa) = zh(1)λa + 1 ≥ λa that λt
possesses at least one stationary value in the interval (λS, λa]. If, however, zh(1)λa+1 < λa ,
there need be no such value. In the case where zh(1)λa +1 > λa and zh(1) < 1, the largest
stationary value of λt is 1/[1 − zh(1)] > λa , which is clearly stable ∀λit ≥ λa . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Given the nature of the claim, it clearly suffices to consider just two households (i = 1, 2),
whose level of human capital may differ after period 0.26 Define t ≡ λ1t + λ2t , namely,
their aggregate human capital at time t . Because their aggregate consumption must be at
least 2(1 + β)csub, the aggregate time their children spend at school must satisfy
e1t + e2t ≤ [t + 2γ − 2(1 + β)csub/α]/γ ≡ ξt .
In period 0, λ10 = λ20 = 1. If ξ0 = 2[(1 + γ ) − (1 + β)csub/α]/γ ≥ 2 and zh(1) + 1 ≥ λa ,
then by choosing e10 = e20 = 1, the problem will have been solved in one generation. If,
however, zh(1) + 1 < λa , both 1 and ξ1 will have been maximized in this case, with
λ11 = λ21 = zh(1) + 1 in period 1.
The other, more plausible, alternative in the state of backwardness is ξ0 < 2, so that uni-
versal, full-time, compulsory schooling is not feasible in period 0. Note that the assumption
α(1 + γ ) > (1 + β)csup ensures that ξ0 > 0. In this case,
1 = z
[
h
(
e10
)
+ h
(
e20
)]
+ 2 = z
[
h
(
e10
)
+ h
(
ξ0 − e10
)]
+ 2,
which is maximized by choosing e10 = e20 = ξ0/2 by virtue of the strict concavity of h(·).
If zh(ξ0/2) + 1 ≥ λa , the problem will have been solved in one generation. Otherwise, we
proceed to period 1.
Suppose the policy of equal treatment is continued in period 1. If the policy program
e1t = e2t (t = 0, 1) yields the maximal value of 2 and the latter is at least 2λa , then the
problem will have been solved in two generations. Whatever the policy chosen in period 0,
however, we have
2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
z
[
h
(
e11
)
λ11 + h
(
ξ1 − e11
)
λ21
]
+ 2 if ξ1 < 2
z
[
h(1)λ11 + h(1)λ21
]
+ 2 if ξ1 ≥ 2.
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Define ψit ≡ λit /t . Then 2 may be rewritten as the product of two functions:
2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
z1
[
h
(
e11
)
ψ11 + h
(
ξ1 − e11
)
ψ21
]
+ 2 if ξ1 < 2
z1
[
h(1)ψ11 + h(1)ψ21
]
+ 2 if ξ1 ≥ 2.
Consider the upper branch first. Because identical treatment of children in period 0 max-
imizes 1, to prove that 2 is maximized by a policy of equal treatment in both periods,
it suffices to show that the expression [h(e11)ψ11 + h(ξ1 − e11)ψ21 ] is maximized by such
a policy. Because identical treatment in period 0 also maximizes ξ1, it follows from the
strict concavity of h(·) that the expression [h(e11)ψ11 + h(ξ1 − e11)ψ21 ] is maximized by
choosing identical treatment in period 1 and ψ11 = ψ21 .27 Following inspection of the lower
branch, we conclude that identical treatment of children within each period maximizes 2.
If, moreover, the said value of 2 is at least 2λa , then the problem will have been solved in
two generations.
By writing t as
t =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
zt−1
[
h
(
e1t−1
)
ψ1t−1 + h
(
ξt−1 − e1t−1
)
ψ2t−1
]
+ 2 if ξt−1 < 2
zt−1
[
h(1)ψ1t−1 + h(1)ψ2t−1
]
+ 2 if ξt−1 ≥ 2,
it is clear that exactly the same argument will hold over as many periods as necessary to
yield λiT ≥ λa (i = 1, 2). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
In period 0,  = s˜ + τ ba implies si0 = s˜ and ˜δ0 = τ ba/(s˜ + τ ba). Now consider the
economy in t = 1. The fraction ˜δ0 of the adult population has human capital λ∗. If they are
to choose a level of education such that their children attain at least λ∗, then they cannot
be taxed. It is clear from Figure 2 and (22) that any net transfer from these households to
the state would yield λ < λ∗ in the next generation. Therefore, to move a fraction of the
remaining households, denoted by ˜δ1, to the knowledge level λ∗ in the next period (t = 2),
the government’s budget constraint implies that
˜δ1(1 − ˜δ0)s˜ = (1 − ˜δ0)(1 − ˜δ1)τ ba, (A.1)
and from (21) we obtain ˜δ0 = ˜δ1. Repeating our argument for every period yields
˜δt = ˜δt−1 = ... ˜δ0 ≡ ˜δ. (A.2)
Therefore, after any finite number of periods, sayn, a positive measure (1− ˜δ)n of households
in the population remains in the state of backwardness, which in turn implies T = ∞. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Consider Figure 4, in which the upper frontier of the feasible set of a family promoted by a
subsidy s1 in period 1 is drawn as B ′C ′, to which an indifference curve is tangential at C ′.
(In the absence of the subsidy, the said frontier is BC, of which B ′C ′ is a parallel shift.) A
family promoted in period 0 attains λ11 in period 1 and pays the tax τ 11 . Its frontier is drawn
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′ ′ 
′ ′ 
FIGURE 4. Minimum time for T = 2.
as E′F ′; by virtue of the upper branch of (26), an indifference curve is tangential to it at F ′.
Because λi2 is a normal good, the indifference curves become flatter as one proceeds along
the horizontal line λ2 = λa. Hence, if the group promoted in period 0 is to attain exactly
λ2 = λa , it follows that E′F ′ must lie to the left of B ′C ′, where it will be recalled that, for
each λ2, E′F ′ is steeper than B ′C ′ by virtue of λ11 > 1. It then follows that
1 = |α{zh[e0(1,−s0)] + 1} − τ 11 (s0) − (α + s1) |
= s1 + τ 11 (s0) − αzh[e0(1,−s0)].
Hence, to minimize 1, we must minimize {τ1(s0) − αzh[e0(1,−s0)]}. It is seen from
Figure 4 that this is equivalent to minimizing E′B ′, whereby B ′ is fixed by s1. Now, an
increase in s0 will increase λ11 and hence make E′F ′ steeper, thereby requiring that E′ be
pushed to the left in order to maintain λ12 = λa . A reduction in s0 is not feasible, for the
financing constraint must be satisfied in period 1. 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Because T is feasible under (P1) with  = ∞, all households will have attained at least
λa at the end of T periods. Suppose household i attains λiT > λa after T periods, having
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reached λiT−1 in period T − 1. Because zh(et )λt is continuous and monotonic in et and λt ,
and zh(0)λ + 1 = 1 < λa , there exists a tax τ T−1(λiT−1) > τ ∗T −1(λiT−1) such that λiT = λa .
Because additional taxation of this kind increases the funds available to subsidize the
poor without jeopardizing the condition λiT ≥ λa , the solution of (P1) with the modified tax
scheme still yields T . Because these considerations apply to any household that attains more
human capital than λa in period T , the tax scheme τ T−1(λiT−1) can be made independent of
a particular household i. Therefore, by appropriate taxation in period T − 1, all households
will reach λa in period T , which proves the corollary. 
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